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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the antecedents and performance outcomes when startup
ﬁrms in the US banking industry hire industry consultants.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a sample of prospective startup banks that applied
for a new bank charter application in Florida between 1996 and 2005. Logistic regression, ordinary least
squares or ordered logistic regression models were used to test hypotheses.
Findings – Analysis suggests complexity and regulatory change are factors in a founder’s decision to hire a
consultant. Consultants have a positive impact on ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance but not on a composite
multifactor measure of performance. Additional analyses suggest the effectiveness of consulting assistance
hinges on speciﬁc attributes of the consulting ﬁrm, but cumulative consulting experience is not one of these
attributes.
Research limitations/implications – This study focuses on the impact of consultants on new venture
performance in a single industry using archival data. Additional research is likely needed to test the
generalizability of the ﬁndings in other research contexts and examine motives beyond the ﬁnancial ones
investigated in this study.
Practical implications – Results suggest that hiring a consultant at startup can satisfy ﬁnancial
stakeholders, but, in a regulated industry, hiring a consultant at startup does not improve a composite,
multifactor measure of performance that is important to industry regulators. When deciding whether to
commit scarce resources to hiring consultants, founding teams should be clear which external stakeholder
andwhichmeasure of performance they are seeking to improve.
Originality/value – While the business advisory role of informal players such as family and friends and
more formal players such as board members and federal, state or local governments have been well
documented, little attention has been paid to the contributions of industry consultants in startup ﬁrms. These
overlooked intermediaries play an important role in the successful launch of a new ﬁrm. This study examines
when andwhy such advisors might create value for new ﬁrms.
Keywords Performance, Legitimacy, Complexity, Consultants, New banks, Regulatory change
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The market for management consultants is a growing one. In 2016, the number of
worldwide enterprises providing such assistance was approximately 715,000, up nearly 30
per cent from a decade earlier. With an expected increase of 164,000 additional ﬁrms in the
next ﬁve years, the industry will generate more than US$258bn in revenues by 2021 (Palmer,
2016).
Despite its size, the management consulting industry is highly fragmented. The industry
comprises largely small ﬁrms that provide specialized expertise and services in
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predominantly local and niche markets. Consultants, or “knowledge entrepreneurs”
(Schaffer and Thompson, 1992), represent a valuable managerial resource for organizations,
as they offer knowledge and skills that help managers cope with the challenges of
environmental and organizational change. While demand for consulting services has
emanated from several different sectors, demand has been strongest in the areas of health-
care and ﬁnancial services, two industries undergoing signiﬁcant change (Palmer, 2016).
The growing prominence of consulting has also led to increased academic interest in the
ﬁeld, particularly in consulting activities around small and new ﬁrms (Stevenson and
Sahlman, 1988; Soriano, 2003; Dyer and Ross, 2008; Chrisman et al., 2012). Chrisman et al.
(2012), for example, focus on new ﬁrms that receive consulting advice from US small
business development centers. While Stevenson and Sahlman’s (1988) emphasis is also on
new ﬁrms, they go further and advocate for the use of consulting “specialists” (rather than
general business consultants) who bring contacts and intimate knowledge of problems
facing new businesses in a speciﬁc industry.
Following Stevenson and Sahlman (1988), the focus of this study is on the antecedents
and impact of industry-speciﬁc consultants in startup ﬁrms in the US banking industry, an
industry where consultants routinely assist new ﬁrms with startup activities due to
regulatory requirements. Speciﬁcally, this study investigates two questions:
RQ1. What factors inform a founder’s decision to seek assistance from industry
consultants?
RQ2. Does such assistance impact ﬁrm performance?
The results indicate that complexity and regulatory change are inﬂuential factors in a
founder’s decision to engage a consultant. The results also suggest that consultants, in
general, have only a modest positive impact on ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance and no impact on
performance using a broader, regulatory measure. This work contributes to the literature on
outside assistance in new ﬁrms by identifying a set of antecedent conditions under which
true startup ﬁrms might use outside consultants and linking this use to different measures
of performance to consider its impact.
Theory development and hypotheses
Deﬁnition of industry-speciﬁc consulting ﬁrms
The term “consulting” can encompass a wide range of both actors and activities and has
been broadly deﬁned and applied in the existing management literature (Semadeni, 2006;
Anand et al., 2007, Fincham et al., 2008). Before proceeding with theory and hypothesis
development, it is important to provide a context for the consultants that are the focus of this
study and explain how they are similar to, or different from, consultants that have been
studied in themanagement literature.
The industry-speciﬁc consultants in this study typically maintain a single industry
practice, are generally small organizations with just a few consultants and have a more
narrow state or region-wide geographic focus. These consultants are more likely to be hired
for short-term, discrete projects, especially under conditions of high environmental change.
For example, Smith (2013) notes that because of the passage of the Affordable Care Act in
2010, many specialist health-care consulting ﬁrms emerged to help healthcare organizations
navigate industry change and “steer clients through an increasingly crowded regulatory
mineﬁeld” (Smith, 2013, p. B1). These industry-speciﬁc consultants are representative of the
types of consultants that are investigated in this study.
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Antecedents of consultant use
Uncertainty is an important undercurrent in a founder’s decision to seek external advice.
Milliken (1987) argues that individuals experience uncertainty because they perceive that
they lack the appropriate information to accurately predict an outcome. Similarly, March
and Olsen (1976) maintain that organizations routinely experience uncertainty about the
policies and practices of their ﬁrms. A founder operating a ﬂedgling new ﬁrm is likely to
experience such uncertainty andmay be inclined to adopt speciﬁc strategies and practices to
manage this uncertainty. These strategies or practices could include the use of consultants
to establish legitimacy, reduce information processing demands activated by complexity
and decipher the implications of regulatory change. Each is explored in more detail below.
Legitimacy. Successfully launching a new enterprise is inherently uncertain. This is
especially true in the US banking industry where close observers estimate that almost half
of prospective new bank founders who explore starting a new bank, ultimately elect not to
do so (Austin et al., 1999). Institutional theorists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) maintain that
organizations attempt to manage uncertainty in their environment by seeking legitimacy.
Legitimacy can be considered a status conferred by important social actors in an
organization’s environment that suggests both desirability and normativity (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). Mimetic isomorphism, the tendency to imitate others, is a primary
mechanism by which organizations seek to establish legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Faced with environmental uncertainty, organizations will tend
to imitate the structures, strategies or practices of other similarly situated organizations,
especially if these referent organizations appear to be successful. Conforming to norms of
expected behavior signals that an organization is acting in an acceptable manner and social
actors should evaluate it as legitimate (Deephouse, 1996). Conversely, a behavior that
deviates from the norm is likely to lead to negative evaluations by these same social actors.
Prior research has largely conﬁrmed the occurrence of such legitimacy enhancing
imitation. In a study of how organizations choose professional service ﬁrms, Haunschild and
Miner (1997) found that such imitation could be based on frequency (i.e. copying common
industry-wide practices), traits (i.e. copying the practices of organizations with certain
relevant features) or outcomes (i.e. copying practices based on their apparent impact in the
market). Knoke (1982) found that the adoption of reforms by government municipalities was
inﬂuenced by the proportion of prior municipalities also embracing such reforms. Likewise,
Burns and Wholey (1993) found that the adoption of matrix management structures by
prestigious hospitals in a region subsequently affected the adoption of those same
management structures by other hospitals in the region. Davis (1991), however, found that
the spread of the poison pill – a takeover defense strategy executed by boards of directors –
in an industry was unrelated to the proportion of prior adopters in the industry. Davis’
(1991) study notwithstanding, most research has generally supported the notion that
organizations tend to imitate one another in an effort to increase their legitimacy.
In the ﬁnancial services industry, government regulators have been identiﬁed as an
important social actor for banks (Deephouse, 1996), as founders must secure the
endorsement and approval of government banking regulators to establish a new bank. As
such, prospective bank founders may be motivated to engage in actions that increase its
legitimacy with this important audience. For example, a Florida business trade publication
(South Florida Business Journal, 2006) noted that a prospective bank founder in the Miami
area had been unsuccessful in launching a new bank because he had followed the “rare
strategy” of not using a consultant during the bank’s startup process. By hiring a consultant
and adopting a strategy that is consistent with normative industry behaviors, a new bank
can signal its legitimacy to banking regulators.
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Thus, if prospective bank founders are motivated to engage in legitimacy enhancing
behavior, such as using a consultant to assist in the startup process as a means of managing
the uncertainty associated with regulatory approval of a new bank, one manifestation of
such behavior would be an observed positive relationship between the proportion of prior
new banks that used a consultant at startup and the use of a consultant at startup by the
focal bank.
H1. There is a positive relationship between consultant use at startup by the focal bank
and the proportion of banks (in the state) that engaged a consultant at startup.
Complexity
One popular view of the complexity of an organization’s task environment portrays
complexity in terms of the heterogeneity and range of an organization’s activities
(Thompson, 1967; Duncan, 1972). Researchers who adopt this view suggest that managers
who operate in such complex environments perceive greater uncertainty and have far more
information processing requirements than managers facing more simplistic environments
(Tung, 1979).
Another view (Evan, 1966) contends that the complexity of an organization’s
environment can be characterized by both the number and variety of other organizations in
the focal organization’s “organizational set” with which it must interact to resolve critical
contingencies. These views converge around the fact that the complexity of an
organization’s environment is contingent on either the variety or number of activities it
involves itself in or the variety or number of players that constitute its organizational set.
Complex and turbulent environments have been shown to increase information
processing demands on managers (Dess and Beard, 1984; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993),
while simple, less intense environments have been shown to require less information
processing (Kotter, 1982; Ancona, 1990). It has been argued that one of the ways that
managers can cope with increased information processing demands is by expanding its top
management team, as larger teams bring enhanced capabilities and more perspectives to
bear on a problem (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Hiring additional managers reduces the
information processing burden for the organization’s CEO (Miller, 1992). Another way in
which founders can adapt to the increased information processing demands of a complex
task environment is by engaging outside experts, such as consultants, for speciﬁc tasks.
Conceptually, this has an impact similar to expanding a top management team, as the new
ﬁrm now has access to additional knowledge and resources. However, the approach of
hiring an outside consultant differs from expanding a top management team in that it does
not require a long-term employment commitment and an outside expert can be hired for
their speciﬁc knowledge related to a component of a new bank’s startup process.
Launching a new enterprise is a complicated task with many requirements and in the
banking industry this task is further complicated by the need to seek approvals from
different regulatory entities. A new bank’s choice of strategy and organizational form has
the potential to complicate the bank’s approval path. For example, the decision to adopt a
bank holding company structure at startup means that a prospective founder must ﬁle a
separate bank charter application with a federal regulatory agency, recruit additional board
members to serve on a second board of directors to oversee the bank holding company and
prepare a second set of ﬁnancial projections and statements to account for the bank holding
company’s activities. These tasks would not be required of a prospective founder who
chooses to launch a new bank using a simpler organizational structure (Austin et al., 1999).
Thus, founders who elect to pursue strategies that call for complex organizational structures
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will face a much more complex task environment at startup because of an increase in the
number and variety of regulatory requirements. To manage the increased information
processing demands imposed by the more complex task environment at startup, founders
may seek consulting help.
H2. There is a positive relationship between the use of a consultant at startup by the
focal bank and the complexity of the proposed organizational form of the new bank.
Regulatory change. In a study of California hospitals and savings and loan associations,
Haveman, et al. (2001) classify regulatory changes that are likely to drive organizations to
alter their strategies, structures and activities as “regulatory punctuations”. Such changes
are characterized by extensive shifts in constraints on business operations that can trigger
pressures to modify the rewards and penalties for organizational actions and create
uncertainty regarding optimal strategies for organizational action (Haveman et al., 2001).
Similarly, Milliken (1987, 1990) adds that such changes create “response” uncertainty where
organizational decision makers are uncertain about the range of response options as well as
their comparative value and utility relative to the organization’s goal. Discontinuous
changes resulting from regulatory modiﬁcations can be difﬁcult to cope with and the net
effect is to raise the level of uncertainty for key players in the organization.
Major banking regulatory changes can greatly expand the strategic and structural
alternatives available to prospective bank founders at startup. The availability of new
choices can generate response uncertainty among prospective bank founders, and these
changes can disproportionately impact new entrants. Founders may seek advice to help
them assess the utility of an extended set of unfamiliar alternatives. Moreover, multiple
regulatory changes can produce a “cascading” effect whereby the current period is more
complicated and uncertain than the period that preceded it, making more likely that a
prospective bank founder will use a consultant in the current period than in a prior period.
Therefore:
H3a. In the period following a major regulatory change, consultant use at startup by
new banks will increase.
H3b. Following an additionalmajor regulatory change, consultant use at startup by new
banks will increase relative to the preceding periods.
Performance implications
Consultants have emerged as an important resource to help new ﬁrms navigate the
nonroutine, complex and uncertain conditions that characterize the startup environment.
Founders, especially those without previous entrepreneurial experience, often come to
realize that they lack critical knowledge in this domain and that specialized industry
consultants possess valuable expert knowledge that can help them bridge this gap. Fincham
et al. (2008) point out that due to repeated assignments with similar clients in the same
industrial sector, specialized industry consultants accumulate speciﬁc, detailed knowledge
that is relevant to the new venture in that sector. Such knowledge can range from general
“know-how” to specialized “privileged” knowledge that leverages technologies and
relationships built by the consultant. Access to this knowledge represents one of the new
ﬁrm’s most important potential advantages (Chrisman et al., 2005).
As outlined above, founders are hypothesized to use consultants to increase legitimacy,
deal with complexity and manage change with respect to their new ﬁrm. However, there is
an implicit assumption that the decision to use a consultant is considered without regard to
MRR
40,11
1146
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 b
y
 U
n
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
S
ai
n
t 
T
h
o
m
as
 A
t 
2
3
:3
2
 3
1
 M
ar
ch
 2
0
1
9
 (
P
T
)
the potential effect on ﬁrm performance. While consultants engaged in short-term
relationships with ﬁrms may be focused on the speciﬁc task at hand and not the ﬁrm’s
bottom-line, the goal of nearly all consultants is to improve ﬁrm performance (Dyer and
Ross, 2008).
When consultants are able to transform their accumulated knowledge into distinctive
and meaningful strategies for their clients, they help launch a positive performance
trajectory for the new ﬁrm, setting it apart from others that do not have access to this critical
knowledge (Werr and Pemer, 2005). Expert knowledge offered by consultants can provide
new banks with an advantage, helping them to move effectively and efﬁciently through the
startup process. The sooner the new bank receives its necessary approvals, the sooner it can
open for business and begin earning a return for early stage investors. Additional costs
associated with hiring a consultant are likely to be offset by greater efﬁciency and increased
speed to market, improving the overall ﬁnancial performance of a new bank.
As entrants in a regulated industry, new banks must concern themselves with how their
performance will be measured by regulators, as well as ﬁnancial stakeholders who are
focused of traditional measures of ﬁnancial performance. Regulators evaluate banks on a
broad composite measure of performance that considers the “safety and soundness”
standards that they are directed to uphold. This measure consists of six factors, including
bank proﬁtability a customary measure of bank ﬁnancial performance. Given that prior
research has found a positive relationship between ﬁrm performance and consultant use
(e.g. Larsson et al., 2003; Chrisman et al., 2005), a positive relationship between a new bank’s
consultant use and its ﬁnancial performance as well as the broader, multifactor composite
measure of performance used by regulators is expected. Therefore, it is hypothesized:
H4a. New banks that use a consultant at startup will see a greater impact on ﬁnancial
performance than those new banks that do not use a consultant.
H4b. New banks that use a consultant at startup will see a greater impact on a
multifactor composite measure of performance as measured by bank regulators
than those new banks that do not use a consultant.
Research method
Sample
The data set for this study includes the population of new bank charter applications
submitted to the Florida Ofﬁce of Financial Regulation (FLOFR) between 1993 and 2005.
This timeframe and state was selected because it was a particularly robust period of new
bank chartering in the USA where nearly 2,000 new banks were formed and Florida led all
states with 161 new banks (FDIC Institution Database www.fdic.gov). Given this study’s
focus on new bank launches and their performance in the subsequent three calendar years, it
is important to capture a time period of muniﬁcent bank startup activity. While the launch
data for new banks in the study ends in 2005, the performance data for these banks extends
to 2008 (three calendar years after the last launch date), ending just before the onset of the
global ﬁnancial crisis. It is also important to note that the global ﬁnancial crisis ushered in a
period of heightened regulatory scrutiny for ﬁnancial institutions which effectively,
suppressed new bank startup activity in the USA[1] during and after the crisis.
During the period of the study, FLOFR received a total of 149 applications for new state
bank charters, of which 127 were ultimately approved. After dropping observations because
of missing data on one or more variables, the sample consisted of 123 useable observations.
This sample was used to test the hypotheses predicting consultant use.
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A subset of the sample above was used to test the hypotheses regarding the performance
impact of consultants. The sample includes banks that commenced operations prior to the
end 2005, to allow for each bank to accumulate three full calendar years of performance.
This three-year window is consistent with the period when regulators intensely scrutinize
new bank performance. After accounting for banks that were acquired prior to the end of the
three-year screening criteria or were missing data on one or more variables, a sample of 68
observations remained for testing the performance hypotheses.
Data
Information on the use of bank consultants was collected from FLOFR, a state-level bank
regulatory agency responsible for chartering new banks in Florida. Demographic and
structural information on the banks in the study was collected from the FDIC’s Institution
Database, a repository that lists all active and inactive banks that maintain federal deposit
insurance.
Information on the backgrounds and characteristics of startup bank founders was
compiled using local, regional and national bank trade publications as well as local business
publications from a variety of geographic locations in Florida. Information was also taken
from biographical entries on new bank charter applications submitted to FLOFR.
Performance data were compiled using information from the FDIC’s Reports of Condition
and Income (“Call Reports”) and from Weiss Ratings Inc., an independent bank rating
agency that measures the performance of banks on a variety of dimensions. Finally,
Thomson’s North American Financial Institutions Directory was also used to identify bank
founders and to cross-validate other demographic entries taken from the previously
mentioned sources.
Measures: antecedents of consultant use model (H1-H3b)
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that represents whether
a bank’s founder used an industry consultant during the startup phase of the bank
(consultant). This information is taken directly from the bank’s initial charter application
that was ﬁled with FLOFR.
Independent variables. A proxy for the relative popularity and imitability of the practice
of using consultants during startup was calculated using the proportion of all startup bank
applications that were ﬁled in the state with the help of consultants in the three years prior
to the focal startup bank’s application (per cent prior banks with consultants). The three-year
window of this measure is consistent with the “peer group” categorization that bank
regulators use when evaluating the performance of startup banks and follows Haunschild
and Miner’s (1997) assertion that any indicator of other ﬁrms’ experience that is longer than
three years is likely too old to inﬂuence the focal ﬁrm.
The presence or absence of a single bank holding company at startup, (SBHC), is used as
a proxy for the complexity faced by bank founders at startup. An SBHC, an afﬁliated “shell”
parent corporation, is advantageous in that it can expand the strategic opportunities for a
startup bank, but also disadvantageous as it increases the regulatory burden of the bank. In
addition to following the rules of its state and federal bank regulators, a new bank with an
SBHC must also apply to and abide by the rules of the Federal Reserve Bank. Close
observers of the banking industry maintain that adding an SBHC during startup materially
complicates the startup process and is generally a less efﬁcient approach to opening a new
bank (Austin et al., 1999).
Regulatory changes were measured using a period-effect orientation (Haveman et al.,
2001). In this approach, discrete periods were identiﬁed when regulatory changes were likely
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to affect the practices and behaviors of organizations. During the period of the study, there
were two important regulatory changes that signiﬁcantly broadened the number and
variety of strategic options that were available to startup banks[2]. The ﬁrst was the
passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996. The second was the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley (Financial Services Modernization) Act of 1999.
The impact of these regulatory changes was accounted for by creating indicator
variables representing the three periods affected by the regulations. Three distinct periods
for startup banks were identiﬁed: those banks ﬁling bank charter applications prior to 1997,
predating the implementation of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (bank
applications before 1997), those ﬁling between 1997 and 1999 and primarily affected by the
implementation of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (bank applications
1997-1999) and those ﬁling after 1999 and affected not only by the Small Business Job
Protection Act but also by the implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (bank
applications after 1999).
Control variables[3]. Control variables were included to account for other forces that may
affect whether a bank founder seeks consultant help at startup. First, variables to control for
the relative muniﬁcence of the startup environment for new banks were included. As the
sample is drawn from a single state, environmental control variables at the county level
were measured to account for differences in the local environment for each new bank. These
include changes in the population (population), employment (employment) and personal
income (income) statistics in the county of the proposed startup bank. In addition, the
number of startup bank applications ﬁled during the three-year window prior to the ﬁling
by the focal bank (previous de novo banks) were controlled for. This serves as a proxy for the
potential level of competition to engage a consultant, a factor that prior research has shown
to be important in determining the likelihood of using professional service ﬁrms (i.e.
Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Collectively, these four variables can account for favorable
environmental conditions that may induce bank founders to forgo seeking outside
consulting help.
The experience of the lead founder of the bank was also controlled for with an indicator
variable, repeat bank founder. This accounts for whether or not a lead founder, as identiﬁed
in either the bank’s charter application or press accounts, has previous bank startup
experience. Self-efﬁcacy research (Bandura, 1977; 1984) has suggested that when one has
previous experience in executing a task, one’s belief in his or her ability to successfully
complete that task again increases. Thus, founders with prior bank startup experience may
see no need to seek consulting help.
Other resources that may be available to assist bank founders during startup were also
included as control variables. The size of the initial board of directors of a new bank at
startup (founding board size) was calculated and used as a proxy for the resources available
to bank founders. Consistent with a resource dependence view of the board of directors
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), bank founders with larger boards may have more resources
(ﬁnancial, human, social, etc.) at their disposal and as a result, may be less likely to rely on
consultants.
Measures: performance implications of consultant use (H4a-H4b)
In the performance implications of consultant use model, a smaller sub-sample of the
original data was used, as well as an expanded set of independent and control variables to
measure the impact of consultant use at startup on new bank performance.
Dependent variables. Two measures of performance were included in the analysis to
account for the interests of the two most relevant stakeholders in this research
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context–shareholders and government regulators. The ﬁrst measure is return on equity
(ROE), a standard measure of general ﬁrm performance and proﬁtability in the banking
industry. A bank’s ROE is computed by dividing its net income by its average equity
capital. It is worth noting that whether ROE is a positive or negative value depends fully on
the value of the numerator (net income). This is because government regulations require
banks to maintain a minimum level of capital to operate, meaning that the denominator of
ROE (equity capital) will always be a positive value. Our ROEmeasure captures the average
ROE for a new bank over its ﬁrst three full calendar years, a time of intense scrutiny by
bank regulatory agencies.
The second measure of performance is based on a bank’s Weiss rating (Weiss) – a score
compiled by Weiss Ratings, Inc., a private bank rating service that measures the relative
safety and soundness of all US banks. The Weiss rating is a multifactor composite score
based on several components of a bank’s performance, including its capital adequacy, asset
quality, management capability, earnings capacity, liquidity and interest rate sensitivity.
Weiss ratings closely track the CAMELS score system that federal bank regulators use to
gauge the overall health and performance of US banks. For the purpose of this study, the
Weiss ratings’ alphabetical scale was transformed into a numeric scale where Aþ = 1,
A = 2, A = 3. . . Eþ = 13, E = 14, E = 15. A low score is associated with high
performance while a high score is associated with low performance. The Weiss score that
corresponds with a bank’s rating at the end of its ﬁrst three full calendar years was used in
the analysis.
Independent variable. The independent variable of interest is consulting help. An
indicator variable, consultant, was used to denote if the founder of each bank engaged a
bank consultant to assist in the startup process.
Control variables. Several of the control variables that were used in the previous
consultant use model above were retained to predict the new bank performance with a use of
a consultant at startup. These variables include population change, employment change and
personal income change. These variables control for economic inﬂuences that may impact
ﬁrm performance.
In this model, other variables that might impact performance were also controlled for.
Bank density accounts for the number of existing banks already present in the startup
bank’s proposed (county) location. Initial equity, a measure of startup capital secured by a
new bank, was used to control for the ﬁnancial resources available to the new bank.
Organizational size (asset size) was controlled for by taking the yearly average assets for a
new bank over the bank’s ﬁrst three full calendar years. As performance was measured
using the ﬁrst three full calendar years, an age variable (age) was included. This variable
represents the number of days between a bank’s charter (opening) date and the beginning of
its ﬁrst full calendar year to account for the variation in the number of operating days
among new banks, as better performance might be linked to length of operating experience.
To account for differences in management ability, a control variable (net interest margin
management) was included. Managing a bank’s net interest margin, the difference in
interest that a bank takes in on loans and returns on deposits, can be considered a proxy for
the operational expertise or capability of bank management. To control for the relative risk
and quality of the assets in a bank’s portfolio, the control variable problem assets[4], was also
included. This variable accounts for the possibility that banks might make high risk and
low-quality loans that lead to improvement in performance in the short run, but
deterioration in performance in the long run. In addition, two variables to control for
characteristics of the bank founder’s prior experience were included. Founders that come
from outside of the banking industry were controlled for with the variable outsider, as it is
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reasonable to assume that banks headed by founders who have prior industry experience
might perform better. The second variable accounts for whether the founder has previously
started a bank, repeat bank founder. This variable controls for whether the lead founder has
speciﬁc bank startup experience, as this might inﬂuence the early success of the ﬁrm.
Finally, the inverse mills ratio (Mills Ratio) was included in this model to account for
potential selection bias. This is necessary to guard against the possibility that there could be
unobserved factors (captured by the model’s error term) that are associated with the decision
to use a consultant that are also correlated with the performance of the consultant. The
inverse mills ratio, the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative probability
density function of a distribution, is derived from the ﬁrst stage of Heckman’s (1979) two-
stage estimation procedure for correcting sample selection bias. In the ﬁrst stage, a probit
model is estimated to determine a key binary choice dependent variable (consultant use).
From this model, an inverse mills ratio is determined (using the probability and cumulative
distribution functions) and used as an independent variable in the second stage outcome
(consultant use) model.
Analyses
Two sets of analyses were performed. In the ﬁrst analysis, logistic regression techniques
were used to test the claims concerning the factors that are expected to inﬂuence a founder’s
decision to engage a consultant (H1-H3b). In the second analysis, both an ordinary least
squares and an ordered logistic regression model speciﬁcation were used to test the
hypotheses regarding the performance implications of consultants (H4a-H4b). An ordinary
least squares speciﬁcation is used when the performance outcome measure is ROE (H4a).
An ordered logistic regression speciﬁcation is used when the performance outcome measure
is a bank’s Weiss rating (H4b). This speciﬁcation is appropriate because the dependent
variable is a score between 1 and 15 (where 1 represents the best performance and 15
represents the worst) and lower or higher levels of performance are associated with each
move up or down the rating scale.
Results
Predicting consultant use model (H1-H3b)
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table I. Signiﬁcant correlations are
observed between consultant use and several of the independent variables. Table II shows
the results from the model predicting the use of consultants. This model begins with a
baseline model of only control variables and expands to include all of the research variables
of interest in order to test H1-H3b. Based on the results of this model, H1 is not supported;
no relationship is observed between consultant use by all prior startup banks and use by
subsequent startup banks. Thus, it appears that establishing legitimacy via imitation is not
a strong factor in deciding whether to engage a consultant at startup.
On the other hand, the model in Table II shows support for H2, H3a and H3b. Bank
founders seek consulting help in response to complex task environments (H2) and
environments characterized by regulatory change (H3a and H3b). With respect to
regulatory change, the results suggest that founders who ﬁled their bank charter
applications after 1999, the third regulatory period, were more likely to use consultants than
founders who ﬁled during either the ﬁrst or second regulatory period. Moreover, in Model 5
in Table II, where the omitted category is changed from bank applications after 1999 to bank
applications 1997-1999, there is support for the cascading effect of consultant use as
predicted in H3b. That is, founders who ﬁled their bank charter applications between 1997
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and 1999 were more likely to use consultants than founders who ﬁled prior to 1997 but less
likely to use consultants than founders who ﬁled after 1999.
Performance impact of consultant use model (H4a and H4b)
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the model predicting the
performance of banks that used consultants are presented in Table III. Table IV shows
the results of the model when ROE is the performance outcome measure. Model 1 represents
the baseline model, comprised of only the control variables, while Model 2 includes the
results of the full model. The full model suggests that banks whose founders use consultants
at startup experience marginally better ﬁnancial performance (p < 0.10) during the ﬁrst
three years of bank operations than the banks of founders who do not. This represents
modest support for H4a – banks that use a consultant at startup will see a positive impact
on ﬁnancial performance.
It is also worth noting that the inverse mills ratio (Mills Ratio), though only a control
variable and not the primary variable of interest in the model, is statistically signiﬁcant.
This suggests that the inverse mills ratio is both detecting and correcting for selection bias
in the model. Stated differently, the inverse mills ratio is correcting for the fact that
unobserved factors related to consultant use are also related to consultant performance.
Table V shows the results of the effect of consultant use when a bank’s Weiss rating, a
multifactor composite measure of performance favored by bank regulators, is used. With
this broader measure of performance, the model suggests that banks that use consultants at
startup do not experience performance gains relative to banks that do not use consultants.
Thus,H4b is not supported.
Additional analyses
The equivocal results above on the performance effects of banks that use consultants led us
to pursue additional analyses. Because the sample data includes the name of the consulting
ﬁrm hired by the founder, it was possible to isolate individual consulting ﬁrm performance.
In the overall sample, four of the consulting ﬁrms in the study were observed to account for
more than 75 per cent of all consulting engagements, including banks that did not
successfully start. The number of engagements performed by these ﬁrms ranged from 5 to 26.
Table II.
Logit regression of
consultant use
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Population  0.03 (0.19)  0.11 (0.20)  0.17 (0.20)  0.42*** (0.23)  0.42*** (0.23)
Employment  0.02 (0.08)  0.04 (0.08)  0.05 (0.08) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09)
Income  0.14 (0.10)  0.07 (0.12)  0.09 (0.12) 0.10 (0.15) 0.10 (0.15)
Previous de novo banks 0.00 (0.01)  0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)  0.05* (0.02)  0.05* (0.02)
Repeat bank founder 0.34 (0.48) 0.52 (0.51) 0.47 (0.52) 0.16 (0.57) 0.16 (0.57)
Founding board size 0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08)
% prior banks w/consultants 2.61 (2.03) 2.26 (2.05)  2.37 (3.02)  2.37 (3.02)
SBHC 1.30* (0.63) 1.66** (0.67) 1.66** (0.67)
Bank applications before 1997  4.76** (1.51)  2.86* (1.36)
Bank applications 1997-1999  1.90** (0.57)
Bank applications after 1999 1.90** (0.57)
Constant 0.75 (1.12)  0.57 (1.52)  0.38 (1.54) 4.46 (2.34) 2.56 (2.28)
Observations 123 123 123 123 123
Notes: *** = p< 0.10; * = p< 0.05 ; ** = p< 0.01
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Consulting ﬁrms that have completed four or fewer transactions are responsible of the
remainder of the consulting engagements. Thus, to conduct these additional analyses,
the original consultant data was segmented into a total of six subgroups: one for each
of the four primary consulting ﬁrms that were identiﬁed, one for “other” (if a
consulting ﬁrm other than one of the primary four ﬁrms was used) and one for “no
consultant” (if no consultant was used). To preserve ﬁrm anonymity, the primary
four consulting ﬁrms are referred to as consultant “I”, consultant “K”, consultant “T”
and consultant “S”.
After this segmentation, new analyses were conducted using the two measures of
performance, ROE and Weiss rating. Table VI shows the results when ROE is the
performance measure and Table VII shows the results when Weiss rating is the
Table IV.
OLS Regression of
ROE performance
(H4a)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Population  0.57 (1.19)  0.53 (1.16)
Employment  0.10 (0.34)  0.15 (0.34)
Income  0.71 (0.69)  0.64 (0.68)
Bank density  0.08 (0.05)  0.10*** (0.05)
Initial equity 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Asset size 0.00* (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Net interest margin management 3.87* (1.62) 4.24** (1.59)
Problem assets  0.003* (0.001)  0.003* (0.001)
Outsider  1.68 (2.33)  1.69 (2.27)
Repeat bank founder  1.16 (2.27)  1.50 (2.22)
Selection correction (Mills Ratio) 3.72* (1.84) 5.74** (2.08)
Consultant 3.88*** (2.03)
Constant  12.84* (9.24)  17.82* (9.40)
R2 0.35 0.39
Observations 68 68
Notes: *** = p< 0.10; * = p< 0.05; ** = p< 0.01
Table V.
Ordered logit
regression of Weiss
rating performance
(H4b)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Population 0.42 (0.30) 0.44 (0.30)
Employment 0.13 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09)
Income 0.10 (0.18) 0.09 (0.18)
Bank density  0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)
Initial equity 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Age  0.004*** (0.002)  0.004*** (0.002)
Asset size 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Net interest margin management  0.87* (0.45)  0.87* (0.45)
Problem assets 0.001** (0.00) 0.001** (0.00)
Outsider 0.86 (0.71) 0.89 (0.72)
Repeat bank founder  1.12*** (0.63)  1.13*** (0.63)
Selection correction (Mills Ratio)  0.62 (0.53)  0.49 (0.62)
Consultant 0.23 (0.58)
Observations 67 67
Notes: *** = p< 0.10; * = p< 0.05; ** = p< 0.01
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Table VII.
Post hoc analysis
ordered logit
regression of Weiss
rating performance
(individual
consultant)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Population 0.31 (0.33) 0.31 (0.33)
Employment 0.15 (0.09) 0.15 (0.09)
Income 0.15 (0.19) 0.15 (0.19)
Bank density  0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)
Initial equity 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Age  0.003 (0.002)  0.003 (0.002)
Asset size 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Net interest margin management  0.56 (0.48)  0.56 (0.48)
Problem assets 0.002** (0.00) 0.002** (0.00)
Outsider 0.81 (0.76) 0.81 (0.76)
Repeat bank founder  1.00 (0.69)  1.00 (0.69)
Selection correction (Mills Ratio)  0.19 (0.63)  0.19 (0.63)
Consultant “I” 0.99 (0.87) 3.62* (1.79)
Consultant “K”  0.16 (0.86) 2.47 (1.75)
Consultant “T”  2.63*** (1.61)
Consultant “S” 0.53 (1.05) 3.16*** (1.87)
“Other” consultant 1.03 (1.01) 3.66* (1.83)
No consultant 2.63*** (1.61)
Observations 67 67
Notes: *** = p< 0.10; * = p< 0.05; ** = p< 0.01
Table VI.
Post hoc analysis
OLS regression of
ROE performance
(individual
consultant)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Population 0.11 (1.23) 0.11 (1.23)
Employment  0.20 (0.34)  0.20 (0.34)
Income  0.84 (0.69)  0.84 (0.69)
Bank density  0.09*** (0.06)  0.09*** (0.06)
Initial equity 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Asset size 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Net interest margin management 3.63* (1.72) 3.63* (1.72)
Problem assets  0.005** (0.001)  0.005** (0.001)
Outsider  2.14 (2.34)  2.14 (2.34)
Repeat bank founder  2.00 (2.32)  2.00 (2.32)
Selection correction (Mills Ratio) 4.98* (2.13) 4.98* (2.13)
Consultant “I” 3.07 (3.24)  12.14*** (6.85)
Consultant “K” 4.00 (2.93)  11.21*** (6.64)
Consultant “T” 15.21* (6.16)
Consultant “S” 0.21 (3.83)  14.99* (7.19)
“Other” consultant 3.60 (3.25)  11.61*** (6.79)
No consultant  15.21* (6.16)
Constant  14.11* (10.19) 1.09 (12.69)
R2 0.44 0.44
Observations 68 68
Notes: *** = p< 0.10; * = p< 0.05; ** = p< 0.01
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performance measure. Table VI (model 1) indicates that only founders who chose consultant
“T” performed better than banks who did not receive consulting help. Furthermore,
Table VI Model 2 shows that banks that chose consultant “T” also outperformed all other
consulting choices (indicated by the negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for all
other consulting choices). Table VII, which uses the Weiss rating as a measure of
performance, shows a similar pattern of results. Consultant “T” is preferable (albeit
marginal at p < 0.10) to the no consultant choice; the signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient on
consultant “T” indicates a lower Weiss rating (i.e. better performance) than no consultant.
Similarly, in Table VII Model 2, when consultant “T” is compared to all other consulting
choices, they are all, with the exception of consultant “K”, worse.
Discussion and conclusion
The primary goal of this paper was to identify and test conditions under which founders
might engage outside consultants during the startup process. Drawing on a variety of
literatures, hypotheses were developed to suggest that concerns over legitimacy, complexity
and regulatory change could inﬂuence a bank founder’s decision to invest its scarce startup
resources in hiring a consultant. The complexity and regulatory change hypotheses were
supported, but the legitimacy hypothesis was not; no relationship was observed between
consultant use by prior banks and consultant use by subsequent banks. This relationship
was further explored by conducting supplemental analyses (not reported here) and
investigating other speciﬁcation alternatives, including a nonlinear “U” shaped speciﬁcation
for prior consultant use, as well as measuring prior consultant use using the gross number
of prior banks that used consultants (rather than the proportion) and a relationship was still
not observed. The lack of support for the legitimacy hypothesis suggests that new bank
founders may assume that legitimacy can be conferred through means other than imitation.
On ﬁrst pass, the failure to ﬁnd a relationship seems odd, given the pervasiveness of
consultant use among new banks (nearly 60 per cent of new banks used a consultant in the
sample) and the “taken-for-granted” expectation by outsiders that new banks will indeed use
them. (A South Florida Business Journal (2006) report linked a proposed new bank’s
unsuccessful launch attempt to the “unusual” strategy of not using a consultant.) However, a
more careful examination of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), speciﬁcally
the imitation claims, highlights an important, but underemphasized aspect of the theory –
ﬁrms tend to imitate the activities of other similar ﬁrms often without a full understanding
of the effectiveness of the practices. While some new banks may imitate the initial strategic
choices of ﬁrms in their organizational set, other new banks may assume that the regulatory
requirements of the industry automatically confer legitimacy and therefore deem imitation
unnecessary to enhance legitimacy.
After developing hypotheses around the conditions under which founders would seek
out consultants, the question of whether or not such consultants enhance ﬁrm performance
was examined. Here, the ﬁndings are less clear: there was a modest positive relationship
between new banks that used consultants and ROE performance, a traditional measure of
bank proﬁtability, but no relationship between consultant use and Weiss ratings, a
multifactor, composite measure of performance preferred by regulators.
The differences in these results may have to do with the nature of each measure. ROE is a
relatively elastic and responsive measure of performance that can vary widely from year to
year. By contrast, Weiss ratings are relatively inelastic and “sticky” and are slow to change
from year to year. Given that the sample comprised new banks, which by deﬁnition are
fragile and unstable, their initial Weiss ratings are likely to reﬂect their general weak
ﬁnancial position and may remain unchanged until they reach a more mature state. This
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makes it more difﬁcult to observe a statistically signiﬁcant effect in the models during the
three year performance window of this study. For instance, one observation in the sample
received the same Weiss rating in each of the three years covered in the study, despite the
fact that its ROE improved markedly each year from 3.23, to 4.39 to 6.96.
Nonetheless, the fact that consultants may inﬂuence one measure of performance but not
another should give founders pause when deciding whether to hire a consultant at startup.
From a managerial perspective, founders should be clear about their objective in hiring a
consultant. If they primarily seek to satisfy their ﬁnancial stakeholders by maximizing the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance, hiring a consultant at startup could be in the ﬁrm’s best
interest. On the other hand, if founders are more concerned with attending to the needs of
regulators by effectively managing their ﬁrm’s Weiss ratings, hiring a consultant may not
pay off.
Finally, additional analyses were conducted where consultant performance was
disaggregated to isolate the effects of speciﬁc consulting ﬁrms and determine whether the
relationship between consultant use and performance was contingent on whowas providing
the consulting. There were two interesting results from this additional analysis. First, one
consultant (“T”) delivered higher proﬁts and better Weiss ratings for their clients than all
other consultants. Second, banks that used this same consultant (“T”) also outperformed
banks that did not use a consultant on both an ROE and Weiss ratings basis. In an effort to
better understand this “high performing” consulting ﬁrm, it was discovered that one of the
ﬁrm’s principals was a former director of the state’s bank regulatory division and had
supervised more than 100 bank foundings during his tenure there. As such, consulting ﬁrm
“T” may beneﬁt from having access to speciﬁc experienced-based knowledge via this
individual that enables it to outperform its peers.
Taken together, these ﬁndings imply that from an economic value creation standpoint,
some consultants are “worth it”, while others are not; choosing well matters and “caveat
emptor” (buyer beware) applies. For example, consulting experience, measured by the
number of prior consulting engagements (a logical criterion by which to choose a
consultant), has no bearing on the bank’s performance in this data set. The top two
consulting ﬁrms in terms of the number of engagements both underperformed the “high
performing” consulting ﬁrm that had fewer engagements. This suggests that a consulting
ﬁrm’s accumulated experience may not be a reliable indicator of its ability to improve
performance. This logic is consistent with the argument that it may be more fruitful to focus
on “ﬁne-grained” measures of experience rather than experience in the aggregate (Argote
et al., 2003).
Still, considering that a majority of new banks are spending an appreciable portion of
their limited ﬁnancial resources on consultants[5] and the economic payoff is uncertain,
perhaps consultants also create value in other meaningful ways. One possibility is that
hiring a consultant may signal important information to bank stakeholders such as
regulators and investors. For example, DeVaughn and Leary (2010) noted that bank
regulators sometimes “fast track” and expedite the bank approval process for new bank
applications that meet certain criteria. Perhaps consultant-assisted new banks enjoy
expedited approvals as well, as consultants are likely to have had repeated interactions with
regulators and are thus more experienced and familiar with the subtleties, nuances and
idiosyncrasies of successfully steering new banks through the approval process. If
expediting the new bank approval process is a byproduct of using a consultant, then new
bank investors, another important stakeholder, may also beneﬁt – the sooner a new bank
can open, the sooner it can began earning a return for its investors.
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From a policy making or regulatory perspective, the fact consultants seem to have only a
modest effect on early new bank performance should be of some concern, especially if
regulators believe that consultant-assisted new banks have been vetted in ways that
unassisted new banks have not. While using a consultant may signal to regulators that a
new bank has the “right stuff” for approval, it does not, unfortunately, signal better
performance, which should be the ultimate goal given a bank regulator’s mandate to closely
monitor the health and stability of individual banks.
Limitations and future research
The results of this study provide several pathways for future research, both to address new
questions, as well as the limitations of the study. One such limitation is this study’s focus on
a single state and industry. While the single location and industry design naturally controls
for potential confounds associated with geography and industry, future research could test
the hypotheses regarding consultant use in regulated and unregulated industries and in
other locations to expand the understanding of the impact of legitimacy, complexity and
change on consultant use and ﬁrm performance. A second limitation of this study concerns
the use of archival data. While the data set is unique, it is difﬁcult to deﬁnitively isolate the
speciﬁc motivations and expectations of the founders with regard to their use of consultants.
To address this issue, the theory building efforts in this paper were corroborated with actual
accounts provided by bankers, consultants and regulators wherever possible. However,
future research could contribute to the literature using a study design that relies on ﬁrst
person accounts, rather than archival data, to understand founder motivations for strategic
decisions.
A ﬁnal limitation concerns the generalizability of the results to other industries.
While the US banking industry may be above average in terms of regulation, the
ﬁndings are likely to hold in other industries that are characterized by high levels of
regulation or regulatory change (e.g. health care, telecommunications, transportation,
etc.). For example, the ﬁndings might be informative for healthcare ﬁrms who because
of the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 (and the possible repeal of this law),
must navigate signiﬁcant changes in the US health-care industry. Nevertheless, it
remains to be seen whether the ﬁndings of this study might hold in more loosely
regulated environments.
With regard to future research, additional studies might consider examining other
motives, beyond those studied here, as to why founders might hire consultants, given
that for most consultants there was an equivocal impact on ﬁrm performance. In this
paper, the focus was on the ﬁnancial value a new ﬁrm might derive from hiring a
consultant. By focusing on the internal demands of a new ﬁrm, for example, future
research may uncover additional ways that consultants create value and perhaps
explain why founders seem eager to invest their limited startup resources in
consultants. For instance, it could be the case that some founders view the decision to
seek consulting help as an effective tool for allocating startup tasks that allows them
the freedom to focus on higher value activities, such as raising startup capital, hiring
managers and generating product demand. These are all possible motives for seeking
consulting help at startup and may be worthy of investigation.
Notes
1. According to FDIC statistics and a report issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
researchers, between 2010 and 2015, only one new bank was launched in the USA.
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2. While these regulatory changes technically aﬀected all banks, from a practical standpoint,
startup banks were most aﬀected as the changes had a larger impact on decisions made at the
start of operations (e.g. number of shareholders to seek, types of stock to issue, type of
organizational structure to use, etc.). Such decisions would have been more diﬃcult to implement
in established banks.
3. For all indicator variables, yes = 1 and no = 0.
4. Problem assets are deﬁned as bank loans that are more than 90 days past due plus loans that
have been written oﬀ as uncollectible.
5. Consulting fees are estimated to be the second largest expense for startup banks after employee
labor costs.
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